As 2017 gets rolling, I am in the process of creating a list of this year's medical conferences and meetings, and other noteworthy events, as I do each year around this time.
I am very interested to hear from visitors: which are the most important or newsworthy meetings to you and your organization? (My contact information is in the sidebar).
I should add that I am also interested in finding opportunities, especially between now and June 1, 2017.
Thanks, and I hope I may look forward to hearing from you!
Thursday, January 5, 2017
Hello everyone, and Happy New Year. I am pleased to say that I had many articles published in a number of magazines and journals last year. A partial list of my 2016 publications follows. Constitutional law, in particular, is a subject I would like to write more about; and I greatly enjoying writing about medicine, especially because I love learning about medicine.
A Compelling Legal History of a Contemporary Civil Rights Catastrophe (Book review: Rogue Justice: The Making of the Security State by Karen J. Greenberg)
Illinois State Bar Association’s HUMAN RIGHTS Newsletter, October 2016
Large Database Study Finds 11 Genes Associated with Increased Ovarian Cancer Risk
TARGETED ONCOLOGY, June 9, 2016
Population Health Management- Worth the Effort?
HIMSS EUROPE INSIGHTS, Vol. 4, no. 3, p. 22
Moving toward personalized medicine for melanoma
DERMATOLOGY TIMES, Jan 7, 2016
Risk Factors for Melanoma and Genetic Testing
DERMATOLOGY TIMES, January 7, 2016
Tuesday, January 3, 2017
This is a cross-posting from my legal commentary blog
(from www.otrompkescommentaries.blogspot.com)
Three Cheers for New York City’s New Freelance Contract Law
by John Otrompke
It may have been buried in the tumult following this fall’s election, but New York City passed landmark social reform legislation in November, which may help to assure that the city continues to be a remarkably decent place to be creative and independent.
The Freelance Isn’t Free Act (FIFA), which became law on Nov. 16, makes significant changes to traditional contract law, and with but one exception, it probably doesn’t raise any major issues under the U.S. Constitution.
While FIFA falls short of the more thorough redistribution of economic power I favor, FIFA should nonetheless be helpful to independent contractors, and is worthy of celebration.
FIFA’s Economic Rationale
FIFA is designed to protect independent contractors; indeed, the law was motivated, in part, by the growth of self-employed workers as a economic sector.
According to some researchers, for example, more than 14.8 million people (constituting more than 10% of workers in the U.S.) were self-employed in 2014. The sector was growing at a rate of 5.4% per year. (1)
Indeed, FIFA is one of a number of laws addressing contract law and independent contractors which governments in New York state have mulled in recent years. Other examples have included the Construction Industry Fair Play Act (2014), the New York State Commercial Goods Transportation Industry Fair Play Act, and Assembly Bill 2539 (2016), which concerns modeling agencies.
Many factors combine to render freelancers vulnerable to unfair contract negotiations. However, contract law applies to almost everyone in our society, and is elegantly simple in design. Therefore, it is useful to learn a little bit of it.
Basically, in our society, having an enforceable contract just requires an offer, acceptance, and consideration.
In layperson’s terms, that just means that both sides agree that there should be a deal, and each side agrees to do something, or give something, of value in exchange for it. In some cases, these critical requirements can even be established through a series of emails.
Nor does a contract even necessarily have to be in writing, though there are a few exceptions, which were created by a law passed in England in 1677, called ‘the Statute of Frauds.’ Exceptions, or types of contracts that have to be in writing to be enforceable, include contracts for marriage, or for the sale of land, or for the sale of goods worth more than $300, or for work which cannot be performed in less than a year, among a couple of others.
How Does FIFA Change Contract Law?
FIFA changes that rule, but it does so in a way that requires the client to assume a little bit of the freelancer’s burden. FIFA requires contracts for work worth more than $800 to be in writing; but it doesn’t appear to render such a contract which is not in writing unenforceable; instead, it penalizes the client by allowing the freelancer to sue them for $200 per violation.
Perhaps FIFA may even apply to a contract that specifies a “kill fee,” or that claims to give the client a right to “cancel” the agreement at will; because such agreements lack what is known as “mutuality of obligation,” such a document could be considered a ‘non-contract,’ and so open up the client to FIFA liability.
And FIFA also contains a prohibition against retaliation, which means that if an independent contractor sues a client for doing business without a written contract, perhaps they could assert a right to future business if they’ve done a good job.
But probably the biggest change to contract law made by FIFA is that it creates a cause of action for double damages for breach. One of the things that makes it hard to be a freelancer in much of the country is that conventional contract law may sometimes only allow an individual to recover the amount they were promised. Hopefully, another FIFA provision, which can make the client pay a freelancer’s attorney fees, will also make it easier to go to court, and thus, make it easier for independent contractors to stay in business.
All in all, FIFA enacts a wide variety of remedies, some of which are available to individuals, while others are available to the City Department of Consumer Affairs, which may pursue civil penalties of up to $25,000.
Of course, there are limitations in the law: it doesn’t apply to doctors, lawyers, or salespersons, for example, and its effective date was delayed for six months.
FIFA is Immensely Beneficial and Probably Constitutional
As mentioned earlier, while FIFA makes some dramatic changes to traditional American contract law, for the most part, the changes are unlikely to have constitutional implications (with one exception, which is soon to be discussed).
Why is that? After all, you might think, Article I, section 10, clause 1, of the American Constitution contains an explicit clause referring to contracts.
For a brief period shortly the Civil War, this clause (known as the “Bills of Attainder clause”) was even referred to as “our Bill of Rights in miniature against the states[.]” (2).
The clause reads “No State shall...pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts[.]”
But much of its import was read out of the Constitution in the Depression era, following a famous political maneuver named by newspapers (and forever after referred to by law professors as) “the switch in time that saved the nine.”
(As an interesting side note, while FDR’s court-packing scheme of the Great Depression era is famous among American legal scholars, it was far from the only time a government has resorted to such measures. Historians, for example, may remember the threat to pack the House of Lords made in 1832 by the British Crown, which had the power of making new peers, and thereby resolved the crisis over the Reform Act, which had been stalled by the bicameral nature of Parliament). (3)
Prior to the Depression and Roosevelt’s court-packing scheme, the Supreme Court had often held that the constitution makes it difficult for the federal government to intervene in contractual matters, good motives notwithstanding.
At the time, the drive to radically redistribute America’s financial power and resources was suppressed, at least temporarily. And when the Depression struck, it became apparent that there was a real place in society for social welfare measures. The jurisprudential situation came to a head in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 US 379 (1937), in which the Supreme Court upheld early minimum wage laws.
Thereafter, many social welfare laws in the 20th century changed contract law.
It is also important to note that some state constitutions still pay respect to the traditional view that the right to earn a living is a fundamental constitutional right. While
such “right to work” laws are sometimes characterized as union-busting schemes, there are some good things about the concept, too. (In particular, such a principle might make it easier to get government-issued professional licenses, take some of the mystery out of the process, and take away a certain amount of governmental discretion in licensure matters).
Conclusion
So if most of FIFA is likely to pass constitutional muster under contemporary views of the Obligation of Contracts clause and the 14th Amendment selective incorporation process, then what is the exception?
There is one other interesting provision of FIFA that I have not yet mentioned, which in some cases makes it a criminal misdemeanor for a client to fail to pay a freelancer.
If this provision is ever enforced, are we headed back to the era of debtor’s prison? While some say that era never really disappeared, the Supreme Court has put
certain limitations on imprisonment for debt. In Bearden v Georgia, 461 US 660 (1983),
the Supreme Court held that a debtor’s imprisonment violates the Fourteenth Amendment in the absence of evidence that the person being prosecuted willfully chose not to pay the debt.
FIFA makes significant changes in the traditional law of contract, which are likely to redound to the benefit of independent contractors. With the possible exception of the law’s criminal provision, FIFA will probably will not raise any constitutional issues.
The main question which remains is whether other jurisdictions will follow suit.
John J. Otrompke, JD, is a legal commentator, and was a 2015 faculty applicant at the Association of American Law Schools faculty recruitment conference. He has never practiced law. He has worked as a freelance journalist, and has been associated with Chicago Working Journalists (which is an effort involving the unionization of freelance writers).
1 Maher M, “Freelance Isn’t Free: The Rise of the Abandoned Workforce,” p. 14 Thesis paper, CUNY Baruch College, Spring 2016 (on file with the author).
2 See, for example, Cummings v Missouri, 71 U.S. 277 (1867); Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333 (1866).
3 Bagehot, W, “The English Constitution,” p. 79 (Oxford University Press, 2009).
Wednesday, November 16, 2016
The Illinois State Bar Association's Section on Human Rights Law has published a book review I have written. I reviewed Prof. Karen Greenberg's book, 'Rogue Justice: The Making of the Security State,’ which deals in part with the USA PATRIOT Act and related matters.
The citation is to The Illinois State Bar Association’s Human Rights Newsletter, Vol. 43 #2, October 2016.
It is reprinted below.
The citation is to The Illinois State Bar Association’s Human Rights Newsletter, Vol. 43 #2, October 2016.
It is reprinted below.
Book Review
‘Rogue Justice: The Making of the Security State’
Karen J. Greenberg
Crown Publishing, New York, 2016
$28 Hardcover
Karen J. Greenberg
Crown Publishing, New York, 2016
$28 Hardcover
A Compelling Legal History of a Contemporary Civil Rights Catastrophe
Karen Greenberg’s ‘Rogue Justice’ is a Brief, but Encyclopedic Account of Modern Times
by John Otrompke
It is a rude awakening to realize that, in the past 16 years, an entire generation in the U.S. has reached young adulthood, without ever knowing life before 9/11. They have lived only during the longest ‘war’ in American history, perhaps inured to a never-ending stream of public massacres. They have been told that Americans have lost our civil rights, but perhaps they can’t really know what that means.
Prof. Karen Greenberg, PhD, does an excellent job of providing a concise, compelling history of the legal aspects of this brutal, dystopian modern era. In ‘Rogue Justice: The Making of The Security State’ (Crown Publishing, New York, 2016), Greenberg, director of the Center on National Security at Fordham University School of Law, unwinds much of the entire narrative in 266 pages.
Every landmark event of this era finds its locus in the text: the 1998 African embassy bombings, the World Trade Center attacks, the passage of the PATRIOT Act, the invasion of Afghanistan, and the second invasion of Iraq . More recent phenomenon are also chronicled: Bin Laden’s killing, the Tsarnaev atrocities in April 2013, the release of the government’s report on torture, and the disclosures of Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning.
To be sure, Greenberg is a historian, not a lawyer, although she teaches a course on national security issues and the law at Fordham Law School. She touches on almost each facet of the retrenchments in American civil liberties made in the past 15 years, with particular emphasis on the apparently universal secret surveillance, the torture policy, and, ultimately, the extra-judicial killing of American citizens by drones commanded by the president.
The work is unbiased, for the author is very unstinting in her criticism not only of the Bush, but of the Obama administration, too. This slim, well-researched volume also goes into the nitty-gritty of recent legal phenomenon such as indefinite detention without trial, growingly harsh punishments for whistle blowers, undisclosed use of surveillance evidence in criminal prosecutions, and even a body of secret law.
An International Law Perspective Essential to Evaluating American Foreign Policy
In documenting these developments, Greenberg has given us an inside look at the official policy-shaping acts of influential lawyers inside the executive’s Office of Legal Counsel, and other branches of the federal government, new and old, through successive presidential administrations. The author has developed this exhaustively-researched history through numerous interviews, personal observation of dozens of trials of jihadists, and even a personal visit to Guantanamo Bay.
Greenberg’s conclusion could be pithily summed up in her statement on p. 40 that the past era has constituted “an undeclared war being waged not on a particular enemy but on an idea, terrorism, which, like most ideas, is probably impossible to eradicate.”
While I admire Greenberg’s work, and respect her methodology, there are some changes I would like to see, should the book go to a second edition. First, while ‘Rogue Justice’ is a popular history rather than a legal text, she touches on enough matters of scholarly and practical interest that the book could use numbered footnotes and better citation to legal authority complying with Blue Book style.
Additionally, there are several issues under international law, the inclusion of which could supplement Greenberg’s perspective. Shortly after 9/11, for example, some experts said that because Bin Laden was not alleged to be acting on behalf of a nation-state, but instead was international criminals, the U.S. was required to demand the trial or extradition of the perpetrators prior to invading Afghanistan (see, for example, “Legal Control of International Terrorism: A Policy-Oriented Assessment,” C. Bassiouni, 43 Harv. Int'l L.J. 83, (Winter 2002)).
Then, in 2003, there was the Bush administration’s violation of the U.N. Charter when France and other Security Council members disclosed their intent to veto the second Iraq war (“We don’t need a permission slip to defend our country.”) It seems that many of the world’s continuing problems stem from that oft-criticized invasion: ISIS, the deadly refugee catastrophe in Syria, perhaps even a fracture in the European Union.
Foreigners May Prefer POW Status to Criminal Trial in Federal Court
Additionally, I disagree with one of Greenberg’s primary themes: that the federal courts are preferable as a locus for the trial of enemy combatants or jihadis, compared to courts martial. As Greenberg has written elsewhere:
“These vexing issues could be far more readily resolved in U.S. federal courts, where
handling classified material under the Classified Information Procedures Act is a time-honored
and effective mechanism — and where judges have addressed the difficult issues involved in
terrorism cases for three decades now. In fact, over 400 cases have been prosecuted in federal
courts since 9/11.”
“Those 28 pages on the Saudis, and these 5 trials of 9/11 plotters: Are we looking for closure in the wrong place?” K. Greenberg, New York Daily News, May 23, 2016 (editorial).
I doubt if a federal court would be more fair to certain jihadis than the military commissions she describes. As she describes it, the case of Ahmed Ghailani (p. 189) is a powerful illustration of this argument.
Ghailani, indicted for a role in the pre-9/11 bombings of African embassies in 1998 in which 224 were killed, was tried not by a military commission, but before a federal court in the Southern District of New York. Although indicted on 285 charges, the jury convicted Ghailani of only one: conspiring to destroy property and buildings. He was not of any charges involving the deaths of human beings. Nonetheless, Ghailani was sentenced to life. But from a defense perspective, an act of war by a combatant arguably should not be prosecuted as a crime, unless it’s a war crime. Had Ghailani been treated as a prisoner-of-war, instead of a federal criminal defendant, arguably he could expect to go home some day.
Greenberg also describes another decision favoring a foreign combatant as retrogressive. The conviction of Salim Hamdan by a military commission for material support was reversed by the D.C. district court after he had served his sentence and been released (p. 248). The federal court found that Hamdan could not be convicted of material support, because that was not a crime when the acts in question took place, long before 2006.
Greenberg says that the 2012 decision “threatened to bring [progress] entirely to a standstill...The military commissions were not only failing to make forward progress; they appeared to be on the verge of moving backward.”
The author tells us that today, these cases (when tried) are almost always brought in federal court. But I have grave misgivings about the expanding assertion of universal criminal jurisdiction by U.S. federal courts, especially when the U.S. has repeatedly refused to recognize the universal jurisdiction of other international bodies.
Americans Can Be POWs, but POWs Have Habeus Corpus Rights
Perhaps what Prof. Greenberg is concerned about is the prospect of American dissidents being tried by military commissions. After all, Greenberg describes several other recent manifestations of executive totalitarianism, such as surveillance, torture, and extrajudicial disappearances, as well as international aggression.
As a bit of backstory, perhaps one reason that fear has not come to pass (at least not yet) has to do with a series of decisions by the Supreme Court, which, when it has acted at all in recent years, has generally issued opinions supporting principles of humanism and fairness in this context.
As Prof. Greenberg notes, the Supreme Court first held that an American cannot be tried by a military court in the civil war-era case Ex parte Milligan (p. 89). But the High Court reached a different decision during World War II in Ex parte Quirin (p. 65), which was distinguished from Milligan because the Americans being tried by military commission in Quirin had actually been a formal part of the German army.
But a different issue is presented, as Greenberg says, by the important question of whether federal courts have any habeus corpus jurisdiction over POWs at all. Many years ago, the Supreme Court told us no, in the World War II-era case of Johnson v Eisentrager. The individuals in Eisentrager (who were not Americans) could not avail themselves of federal habeus corpus review, because jurisdiction only lay in courts in the jurisdiction in the which prisoners are located.
So why do federal courts have jurisdiction over POWs today? The principle of Eisentrager was overruled, the Supreme Court told us in Rasul v Bush, by a rather esoteric Supreme Court case from 1973, called Braden v 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, which did not involve prisoners-of-war. In Braden, the Supreme Court ruled that a habeus petition can be brought in any district court in which the custodian can be served, regardless of the location of the prisoner.
That is how foreign combatants came to have access to the great writ: in an act of legal jiu-jitsu, the Supreme Court relied on an obscure 1973 opinion, authored by Justice Brennan, to protect human rights in the midst of the civil liberties catastrophe that followed in the wake of 9/11.
An Unprecedented Expansion of Freedom in the 21st Century
So for young adults, how has life changed in the U.S. since the PATRIOT Act? Surprisingly, in many ways, Americans are far freer today than we were in 2001.
In the past era, there were no LGBTQ rights under the U.S. Constitution. Cannabis was universally criminalized here, and the Second Amendment was not thought to protect an individual right to own a firearm. While massacres in the U.S. have become a phenomenon of appalling recurrence and regularity, they have been most often committed by Americans.
In short, as a matter of visible law, many Americans have been seeing an unprecedented expansion, not a contraction, of our civil rights. This contrasts with the experience of many generations in the Middle East, going back to the period after World War I, for whom American foreign policy was often anything but a boon.
Developments since 2001 make it clear that radical change can be effectuated in the federal courts. When it has acted at all, the Roberts Court has often acted to promote human freedom, sometimes in surprising ways. But a foreign combatant might prefer prisoner-of-war status to a trial in a federal court.
‘Rogue Justice’ is a gripping account of a true history which moves through the history of the past 15 years with the energy of a whirlwind. While I may disagree with one of her themes, Greenberg’s diligent research has made a significant contribution to the legal history of current events.
(c) 2016 John J. Otrompke, JD
Saturday, November 5, 2016
News from the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Suicides Among Very Young Children on the Rise
in Black Children and White Girls
Research in this Area Hindered by Statistical Difficulties and IRB Requirements
by John Otrompke
Suicides among very young children in the U.S. have been on the increase in certain subgroups since 1993, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control discussed at the AACAP meeting last week.
Among children in the U.S. between the ages of five and 11 years old, 657 committed suicide between 93 to 2012, and 87 did so in 2013 and 2014.
While the suicide rate among children has remained stable over the past 20 years, the rate has increased among black children and white girls, according to a poster presented last week at the annual meeting of AACAP in New York (poster 1.55, ‘Suicide Trends Among Young Children in the United States from 1993 to 2014’ [Logan, et al]).
The poster presented the first subgroup analyses of suicides among children in the given age range, according to Kseniya Yershova, PhD, deputy scientific director at the Center for Suicide Risk Assessment at the New York State Psychiatric Institute, who is a co-author.
A Significant Increase in Child Suicides Since 1993
The rate of suicides among black children increased from 1.37 per million in the first five-year period between 1993 and the end of 1997, to 2.96 per million in the final two-year period from 2013 to 2014, for a incidence rate of 1.24, according to Vladislav Mandzhiyev, a biomedical engineering student and a co-author who co-presented the poster on Wednesday, Oct. 26. The increase was found to be statistically significant (p<.05)
The suicide rate among white girls also increased to a degree which was statistically significant, going from 0.24 per million in the first five-year period, to 0.75 per million in the two-year period (incidence rate ratio 1.63).
However, the increase among white girls in the U.S. was masked when the data were analyzed by the moving average method of statistical analysis; instead, the change was only notable when analyzed by period trend analysis.
Studies of suicides in young children have been complicated by low incidence and high fluctuation, according to the abstract. “Prior authors couldn’t analyze the suicide rate among young girls because there were not enough cases. But when we added two additional years of data compiled by the Centers for Disease Control to the data from 1993 to 2012, we found we could do the analysis,” Yershova explained.
For white children as a whole, the rate went from 1.14 suicides per million to 0.99 per million, indicating a decrease, according to Mandzhiyev. Historically, the rate of suicides was higher among the white population, the poster said.
Early Identification and Treatment Important
“Suicide is an expression of extreme suffering. The children are learning to regulate their emotions, so you cannot skip the youngest group. If they go to the emergency room for a toothache, the provider needs to ask about thoughts or feelings about death, even in the little guys. Doctors need to ask about possible risk factors for suicide in the pediatrician’s office,” said Yershova.
“The children need the support of their parents in learning to regulate their emotions, so providers need to work with their caregivers,” she added.
Guns, suffocation, and poison are the three most common methods of suicide in the age range, according to Yershova. “In older groups, the availability of prescription drugs, especially pain medication, may also be behind the increase, inasmuch as girls do use poison as a method much more frequently than boys,” she said, noting that poison is much more likely as a suicide method if the poison is not locked up.
“It would be nice to know the reasons for the increase, and there is a methodology called the psychological autopsy, in which providers interview the family,” said Yershova.
However, the practice of psychological autopsy can’t be undertaken universally, as ethics approval is required, she added.
Friday, April 22, 2016
Offering Expense-free coverage from ASCO
Dear readers,
I will be attending and covering ASCO 2016 in Chicago. I am seeking additional assignments, and do not require reimbursement for an expenses. I am seeking assignments without deadlines prior to June 9.
http://www.asco.org/latest-news-releases/2016-asco-annual-meeting-press-program-highlights-advances-cancer-research?et_cid=37712928&et_rid=471661350&linkid=Read+the+Full+Release
I am a veteran ASCO correspondent. Credentials available upon request. Contact info below.
Sincerely,
John
John_Otrompke@yahoo.com
I will be attending and covering ASCO 2016 in Chicago. I am seeking additional assignments, and do not require reimbursement for an expenses. I am seeking assignments without deadlines prior to June 9.
http://www.asco.org/latest-news-releases/2016-asco-annual-meeting-press-program-highlights-advances-cancer-research?et_cid=37712928&et_rid=471661350&linkid=Read+the+Full+Release
I am a veteran ASCO correspondent. Credentials available upon request. Contact info below.
Sincerely,
John
John_Otrompke@yahoo.com
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